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Ina case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held, in Yoswick v. 
State, 347 Md. 228, 700 A.2d 251 
(1997), that parole eligibility is a 
collateral rather than a direct 
consequence of a criminal 
defendant's guilty plea. 
Therefore, the defendant does not 
need to be informed of the parole 
ramifications for the plea to be 
. considered voluntary. In so 
holding, the court clarified the fact 
that criminal defendants in 
Maryland do not have a 
constitutional right to be informed 
of the consequences of their pleas 
with regards to future parole 
opportunities. 
On February 25, 1992, David 
Yoswick (uYoswick") kidnapped 
Frank Storch ("Storch") and kept 
him handcuffed in a motel 
bathroom overnight. Yoswick then 
took Storch via automobile to a 
remote location in Carroll County 
where Yoswick stabbed Storch in 
the stomach with a knife. Yoswick 
then tried to drown Storch by 
holding his head under water at a 
nearby creek. Storch feigned 
death and Yoswick left the scene. 
Storch managed to stagger to a 
nearby road where he was picked 
up and taken to the Maryland 
Shock Trauma Unit. 
On February 27, 1992, 
Yoswick drove to a landfill and 
attempted to dump a bag of 
Storch's posseSSions. Soon 
thereafter, Yoswick was 
apprehended. Yoswick was then 
indicted by a Grand Jury in Carroll 
County in a twenty count indict-
ment including kidnapping, 
robbery and attempted first 
degree murder. Charges were 
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also pending against Yoswick in 
Howard and Anne Arundel 
Counties as a result of this 
incident. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Yoswick pleaded guilty to 
attempted first degree murder and 
kidnapping in Carroll County. The 
State, in exchange for his plea, 
entered a nolle prosequi on the 
other eighteen charges and 
recommended to other 
jurisdictions in Maryland that they 
drop their charges against 
Yoswick. As a result of the plea, 
Yoswick received life 
imprisonment with all but forty 
years suspended on the 
attempted murder charge and also 
received thirty years on the 
kidnapping charge, with the time 
to be served concurrently. 
Yoswick could have potentially 
received, if convicted on all 
charges in all three jurisdictions, 
up to life plus 170 years in prison. 
After the court accepted his 
plea and sentenced him, Yo swick 
filed a Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief, alleging that he was 
improperly informed of the parole 
consequences of his plea. 
Yoswick stated that his defense 
counsel wrongly informed him that 
Recent Developments 
he would be eligible for parole in 
ten years, when a sentence of life 
imprisonment carries a statutory 
fifteen-year time limit before 
parole eligibility commences. 
Yoswick also alleged that he was 
not informed of the necessity of 
obtaining the Governor's approval 
before he could receive parole. 
He asserted that he pleaded guilty 
because he had received 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The circuit court rejected his 
claims and concluded that the 
plea was knowing and voluntary. 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed. After careful 
examination, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland also affirmed the 
decision. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland began its analysis by 
examining what makes a plea 
valid. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 239, 
700 A.2d at 256. First, a guilty 
plea must be made voluntarily an~ 
intelligently. Id. (citing Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 
(1969». The court explained that 
the defendant must have 
knowledge of the direct 
consequences of the plea. Id. 
(citing Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 755 (1970); Hudson v. 
State, 286 Md. 569, 595 (1979), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 
(1980». 
The court then defined a direct 
consequence of a guilty plea as 
one that has "'a definite, 
immediate, and largely automatic 
effect on the range of the 
defendant's punishment.'" Id. 
(quoting Cuthrell v. Director, 
Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 
1366 (4th Cir.1973». It reasoned 
that parole eligibility depends 
28.1 U. Bait. L.F. 57 
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upon a number of factors that are 
largely controlled by the inmate's 
conduct as well as the decisions 
of the Parole Commission. Id. at 
241, 700 A.2d at 257. The court 
stated that it has no control over 
these factors and that parole 
eligibility is a collateral, not a 
direct, consequence. Id. The 
court noted that due process does 
not require that the defendant be 
informed of the collateral 
consequences of his or her plea. 
Id. Also, a guilty plea is not 
rendered involuntary because the 
defendant was not informed of the 
collateral consequences of the 
plea. Id. It pointed to several 
other court decisions which 
agreed. Id. at 241-42, 700 A.2d at 
257 -58 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 56 (1985); United States 
v. Sanc/emente-Bejarano, 861 
F. 2d 206, 209 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Brown V. Perini, 718 F.2d 784, 
788 (6th Cir. 1983); Strader V. 
Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 63 (4th Cir. 
1979». 
The court then turned its 
attention to whether the trial court 
imposed a mandatory fifteen-year 
sentence on Yoswick. Id. at 242, 
700 A.2d at 258. If there was a 
mandatory sentence of· which 
Yoswick was not informed, 
Yoswick's plea would be invalid. 
Id. (citing Hunter V. Fogg, 616 
F.2d 55, 61 (2d Cir.1980». The 
court opined that a mandatory 
minimum sentence is one where 
the court cannot exercise its 
discretion when sentencing. Id. 
(citing State ex. reI. Sonner V. 
Shearin, 272 Md. 502, 518-19, 
28.1 U. BaIt. L.F. 58 
325A.2d 573,582 (1974); State V. 
Coban, 520 SO.2d 40, 42 
(Fla.1988». The court held that 
Yoswick did not receive a 
mandatory minimum sentence 
because the trial court exercised 
its discretion by imposing a life 
sentence with all but forty years 
suspended. Id. at 242-43. Article 
41, section 4-516 of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland, which provides 
for a fifteen-year period before 
parole can be granted, does not 
constitute a mandatory minimum 
sentence because, as the court 
explained, "it does not change the 
nature of the parole eligibility to 
make it an automatic, definite, and 
immediate consequence of 
pleading guilty." Id. at 243. 
The court then analyzed 
whether Yoswick's counsel's 
wrong advice pertaining to parole 
deprived him of effective 
assistance of counsel. Id. at 244, 
700 A.2d at 259. In order to 
sustain a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the court 
stated, Yoswick must "'prove that 
counsel's performance was 
deficient and that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the 
defense.'" Id. (quoting Oken v. 
State, 343 Md. 256, 283, 409 A.2d 
692,705 (1996), cert. denied, 117 
S.Ct. 742 (1997». The court 
stated that in order to prove 
prejudice, Yoswick must show that 
but for his counsel's errors, he 
would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on a trial. Id. 
at 245 (citing Hill V. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 59 (1985». The court 
bolstered its argument by pointing 
out that Yoswick could have 
received life imprisonment plus 
170 years if he had proceeded to 
trial, compared to the forty years 
of imprisonment he actually 
received. Id. at 246-47,700 A.2d 
at 260. Additionally, the record 
. did not reflect any reluctance on 
Yoswick's part when he made the· 
plea. Id. The court also noted 
that Yoswick could become 
eligible for parole in less than 
fifteen years, possibly even less 
than eleven years and two 
months. Id. at 249 n.7, 700 A.2d 
at 261 n.7. The court held that 
Yoswick was not prejudiced by his 
counsel's misinformation because 
the court believed that a 
reasonable defendant in 
Yoswick's situation would have 
pleaded guilty even without any 
information about parole eligibility. 
Id. at 246, 700 A.2d at 260. The 
court concluded that Yoswick 
"clearly received the benefit of the 
bargain." Id. at 247. 
Significantly, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland in Yoswick V. 
State held that the parole 
consequences of a guilty plea are 
collateral. As a result of this 
decision, trial courts and defense 
counsel in Maryland are not 
required to advise criminal 
defendants of the ramifications of 
guilty pleas on parole eligibility. 
Thus, the court held that parole 
eligibility is not a mitigating factor 
to be considered when a criminal 
defendant makes a guilty plea and 
subsequently attempts to reverse 
a guilty plea by raising parole 
issues on appeal. 
